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Sands China Raises $2.5B in IPO – Analyst Blog
Las Vegas Sands ( LVS) Macau unit, Sand China raised $2.5 billion through its Hong Kong initial public offering (IPO). The company has priced the IPO for 1.87 billion shares at HK$10.38 per share, the low end of the expected HK$10.38-HK$13.88 range.
The proceeds from this offering, combined with $1.75 billion in bank financing, would aid Sands China to restart its Macau's Cotai Strip construction projects. Last year, the company was forced to halt its casino expansion projects in Macau due to financial constraints, at which time it laid off 11,000 workers.
The IPO is being handled by five investment banks. Citigroup ( C) and Goldman Sachs ( GS) are the joint global coordinators for the offer while Barclays PLC ( BCS), BNP Paribas SA and UBS AG ( UBS) are the underwriters.
Earlier, in October, rival company Wynn Resorts ( WYNN) had held its IPO for its Macau assets. Wynn Macau has experienced a strong debut in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Wynn sold 1.25 billion shares or a 25% stake in its Macau business. However, the shares of Wynn Macau are now trading at a discount to the offering price.
Macau is the only Chinese city where gambling is legal. It has become an attractive destination for casino companies such as Las Vegas Sands, Wynn Resorts and MGM Mirage ( MGM), which are investing billions for expansion on this island. Macau has survived the economic downturn relatively well.
Macau has generated HK$105.6 billion ($13.5 billion) of gross gaming revenue in 2008, more than double the revenue generated by the Las Vegas strip. Also, visa restrictions had recently been slackened by Beijing to allow mainland tourists to visit Macau once a month rather than twice a year.
The capital bolstering initiatives augur well for Las Vegas Sands, which has a robust development pipeline, with projects in Macau, Las Vegas, Singapore and Pennsylvania. Read the full analyst report on "LVS"Read the full analyst report on "MGM"Read the full analyst report on "WYNN"Read the full analyst report on "C"Read the full analyst report on "GS"Read the full analyst report on "BCS"Read the full analyst report on "UBS"Zacks Investment Research
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| Mon, Nov 16, 2009 |
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A Closer Look at Executive Compensation
By Eric JacksonFrom RealMoney.com 11/13/2009 1:59 PM ESTClick here for more stories by Eric Jackson We read a lot about corporate governance and executive compensation these days, in the wake of last year's economic collapse. Many politicians are now jumping into the fray, saying we need to legislate certain governance requirements, such as splitting the roles of CEO and chairman or lowering CEO pay. Although philosophically I support many of these arguments, it turns out that many of these prescriptions have no long-term relationship with an increase in a company's stock price. Which of these governance and executive pay factors should you pay attention to as an investor?
As any good investor knows, there's no silver-bullet metric (such as P/E ratio or price-to-book or leverage ratio) that, on its own, predicts a stock future increase or decrease. Even if you take a number of internal factors into account, your perfect analysis can be thrown out the window by an industry downturn or some random comment by Tim Geithner on his trip to Asia. With this in mind, I believe you can improve your investment batting average by paying attention to two factors relating to corporate governance and executive compensation that most people overlook. Two Kinds of Insider StockFirst, how much stock do the company's directors own? In a big long study I took part in several years ago, we scoured company's proxy statements and examined how a bunch of so-called "good" corporate governance factors were actually linked to longer-term stock returns. Almost all of them (such as whether there was a split CEO and chairman, or if the board had a number of "independent" directors or not) had no correlation with stock price increases. However, we found one variable that had a whopping link: whether a company had a lot of directors who had dug into their own pockets and actually bought stock in the company. This is different from a case in which stock ownership in the company was only due to stock grants or stock options. When we talked to directors about this finding, they said it didn't surprise them. It's the difference between having "found money" on the line (i.e., their stock was paid for from other people's money, not theirs) instead of their own. One director said, "I sit on a lot of boards right now, but there's one where I've got about $250,000 of my own money on the line. It sounds bad to admit it, but I care a heck of a lot more about how that company does. I lose sleep over it." If you were a shareholder in that company, his sleepless nights are probably comfort to you. I bet there are many Bank of America (BAC - commentary - Trade Now) and Citigroup (C - commentary - Trade Now) shareholders wish they'd had more directors losing sleep (and their own money) a couple of years ago. Payments to the Chief The second characteristic I like to look at is the total compensation the CEO and his/her management team take home. Is it significantly above other companies in that industry, even though the stock returns between the companies over time is not different? If so, that's a big red flag. Why does this management team (and the board members who approve their pay packages) think they're worth so much more than their peers, with no commensurate better historical track record? As part of total comp, you should also look out for extreme executive perks that have been thrown in to supplement an executive's already high salary. I mentioned recently a Las Vegas Sands (LVS - commentary - Trade Now) senior vice president, Rob Goldstein, who got the company to pay $364,000 to remodel his home and never had to pay it back. Mark Hurd and his senior management team at Hewlett-Packard (HPQ - commentary - Trade Now) saw their total compensation double last year, after they imposed 10% to 15% pay cuts across the organization. The H-P execs also get to spend hundreds of thousands of shareholders' dollars jaunting around the country on the H-P corporate jets for personal use, with hotels and meals also covered for personal use. I've heard some people say, "Who cares about the perks? Shocking that there's gambling going on in the casino. Come on." I disagree. Not every CEO or management team does this. It says something about how they approach executive decisions. To me, it tells me that they will look for every chance to make decisions that benefit them first and foremost before the shareholders. I don't want to invest in a company like that. (Maybe not surprisingly, I currently have short positions in LVS and HPQ because of many factors, but the perks factor certainly played a role in my decision.) So how do you find this information? It's easy: go to the SEC's Web site. Search "company filings" and look for the company's most recent proxy statement. Its technical filing name is "DEF-14A," which stands for the company's definitive proxy statement. In there, you will find info on who is on the board of directors, how much they're paid, their bios, and how much stock they own in the company. It's not always immediately obvious how much of their current stock ownership is from past stock grants and stock options given to them (for free) vs. how much they've bought themselves, but it can be figured out if you look over a number of these past filings. In the same filing, you'll find everything you've ever wanted to know about how much in total comp the management team is making (and more), down to the often most illuminating footnotes. The SEC is often tinkering with its requirements on companies in how they present this data. However, the current version makes it clear what each exec's total comp is. These two characteristics of outside directors' stock ownership in their companies and the size of CEO total comp and executive perks aren't silver bullets. They should supplement all the normal financial analysis you do. However, they can often be very helpful in deciding whether to proceed with an investment or not. At the time of publication, Jackson's fund held a net short position in LVS and a short position in HPQ. Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.



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| Thu, Nov 12, 2009 |
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(ARM) ArvinMeritor’s Loss Deepens
ArvinMeritor (ARM) showed a loss of $20 million or 28 cents per share, before special items, in the fourth quarter of its fiscal year ended Sep 30, 2009. This is wider than the quarter-ago loss of 25 cents per share and compared to year-ago profit of $26 million or 35 cents per share.
The loss was [...]
(ARM) ArvinMeritor’s Loss Deepens
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| Wed, Nov 11, 2009 |
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ArvinMeritor’s Loss Deepens – Analyst Blog
ArvinMeritor ( ARM) showed a loss of $20 million or 28 cents per share, before special items, in the fourth quarter of its fiscal year ended Sep 30, 2009. This is wider than the quarter-ago loss of 25 cents per share and compared to year-ago profit of $26 million or 35 cents per share.
The loss was attributed to incremental tax expenses during the quarter due to the inability to recognize the tax benefit of losses in certain countries. However, the loss was narrower than the Zacks Consensus Estimate of 32 cents per share.
Sales in the quarter totaled $984 million, a decline of 36% from the year-ago level of $1.5 billion. This was driven by continued weakness across the global markets. However, sales increased by 4% compared to the previous quarter of fiscal year 2009 due to improved conditions in global markets, particularly in China, India and Brazil.
Cost Reductions
ArvinMeritor achieved cost savings of $195 million in fiscal 2009, exceeding the target of $125 million under its Performance Plus plan. The cost savings were helped by layoffs and temporary salary reductions, curtailment in capital spending, extended manufacturing shutdowns, elimination of training programs, suspension of the quarterly dividend and elimination of all non-critical discretionary spending.
The company also announced the closure of its assembly, machining and casting facility in Carrollton, Kentucky and the braking systems facility in Tilbury, Ontario, Canada.
Divestitures
ArvinMeritor completed the sale of its entire ownership interest in Gabriel de Venezuela and Meritor Suspension Systems Company joint ventures, Wheels business and Gabriel Ride Control Products in North America.
These transactions largely completed the divestiture of Chassis Systems business under the company’s Light Vehicle Systems (LVS) business segment. The divestments reduced the company's overall light vehicle business to 25% of total sales at the end of its fiscal year.
Business Segments Redefined
ArvinMeritor redefined its reporting segments following the recent divestiture of most of its LVS businesses. For continuing operations, the company has informed that it will report results as defined within Commercial Truck, Industrial, Aftermarket & Trailer and Light Vehicle Systems. Of these four segments, the first three have been considered core to the company.
Financial Position
ArvinMeritor had cash and cash equivalents of $95 million as of Sep 30, 2009. Long-term debt amounted to $1.1 billion as of that date. The company had a shareholder deficit of $1.3 billion as of the same period.
Free cash flow was $22 million in the fourth quarter compared to $103 million in the prior fiscal year quarter. The company had $95 million in cash balance and an unutilized commitment of $611 million under its revolving credit facility as of Sep 30, 2009.
In fiscal 2009, ArvinMeritor had a net cash outflow of $295 million from operating activities, in sharp contrast to an inflow of $163 million in the previous fiscal year. Meanwhile, capital expenditure reduced to $111 million from $138 million in fiscal 2008.
Looking Ahead
In the upcoming fiscal year, ArvinMeritor expects revenue to be higher and free cash flow to breakeven. In addition, the company expects capital expenditures in the range of $90 million to $110 million.
Despite its efficient cost management and commendable global footprint, we believe difficult market conditions across the global automotive markets will continue to adversely affect the company. This has led us to maintain our Neutral recommendation for the stock. Read the full analyst report on "ARM"Zacks Investment Research
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Risk of Snake Eyes for Las Vegas Sands
By Eric Jackson TheStreet.com/RealMoney 11/10/2009 2:36 PM EST With its stock price is up over 800% since its March lows, Las Vegas Sands (LVS - commentary - Trade Now) plans to raise up to $3.3 billion in a Hong Kong IPO listing of its Asian assets later this month. While it has great potential upside from its properties in gambling territory Macau, there are still a number of risk factors facing the casino that could cause it to trip its debt covenants on its massive $12 billion in liabilities over the next 18 months. Because of those risks and lax corporate governance oversight, I've initiated a short position on the stock. Here's why.
Risk 1: Losses will persist without a meaningful upturn in operating performance. Despite a surge in Macau-based profits and management claims of cutting $500 million in operating costs from the business, Sands still is losing money, and at an increased rate year-on-year. It had over $1 billion in operating expenses in the recent quarter alone. The bet that bulls on the stock are making is that we've hit bottom and that rooms, banqueting and convention revenue will all come back from current levels. On the recent earnings call, management noted that Macau had done particularly well recently, partially because of increased traffic over the October Golden Week holiday. The company pointed out that Las Vegas room bookings were up for January and February. However, the likelihood of a continued soft market in Vegas (especially with MGM's new CityCenter dumping 5,000 new rooms on the strip next month) seems high, even with Macau. It appears reasonable to assume that losses will persist over the next two years, at a time when it's vital for LVS to navigate its way through its debt obligations. Risk 2: Debt requirements will only get tighter over the next year. Like its losses, Las Vegas Sands' debt and liabilities have increased over the last year. It had $12 billion in debt as of the end of September -- up 13% from a year ago. LVS's biggest risk in holding such a high amount of debt while losing money is meeting its debt covenants, which include tightening the allowed ratio between debt and EBITDA, currently at a ceiling of 6.5:1 for US-related debt. Management says it is now running a ratio of 5.78:1. Starting July 1 2010, the allowed ratio will drop to 6:1. Then, on January 1, 2011, it will drop again to 5.5:1 and stay there.
Sands has been able to sell stock and debt in order to supplement its EBITDA and stay within its debt covenants. Recently, it pre-sold $600 million in projected proceeds from the planned Hong Kong IPO of its Asian assets later this month, presumably because it needed the extra cash early. Once it completes its public offering, it should receive another $1.7-2.5 billion (net of the already-sold $600 million and the bankers' underwriting fees). The company has three types of debt related to its US, Macau and Singapore (Marina Bay) developments and operations. All senior debt is held by Lehman Brothers Commercial Paper (or affiliated entities). It appears that Alvarez & Marsal (overseeing the wind-down of Lehman) is now in charge of Sands' debt obligations and they have more incentive to play hardball on enforcing terms compared to a troubled Citibank, Bank of America, or Wells Fargo. In an interview with CNBC in July, Bryan Marsal talked -- in general terms, not specifically about Las Vegas Sands -- about how many companies were in phase one of a three-phase discussion with their creditors: (1) extend and pretend (that they will somehow be able to bounce back in order to re-pay their debts), (2) amend (the terms of their covenants -- or at least try), and (3) send (as in, send in the keys for the properties to the creditors). If Sands defaults on one debt obligation, it triggers a cross-default across all its debts. Assuming the losses continue, its new IPO proceeds will help, but the company will still face potential problems later next year, as its debt-to-EBITDA ratio ratchets down. Risk 3: Continued development in Macau. According to its most recent 10-Q, Sands estimates it will need approximately $2.6 billion to complete development at Macau. It currently has about $3 billion in cash (about the same level as a year ago), plus the new funds coming in from the Hong Kong IPO. It's likely that Sands will need to keep a certain amount of cash on its balance sheet to satisfy its lenders. This means that, even using all the IPO proceeds, Sands will not necessarily have sufficient cash to finish off Macau -- if losses persist.
Las Vegas Sands is required to finish completion of Parcel 3 of the Cotai strip by mid-2011, or risk passing over the keys to all of its Macau assets to the Chinese government. It also needs to build out parcels 4 to 8 (and receive permission from the government), but not as quickly. It is obviously trying to do everything it can to minimize its development costs (right out of the "extend-and-pretend" playbook). Sheldon Adelson is known for slipping delivery deadlines.
However, there are a number of Macau risks (let alone Singapore) that remain, including the potential for less strong traffic in current and future quarters compared with the recent Golden Week-aided quarter, restrictions on travel to Macau by the Chinese government for fear of over-gambling, Sands's need to spend more on ferry access or face reduced traffic, potential cost overruns on existing development and any potential health scare (like heightened concern about the H1N1 virus) that could reduce traffic. Taken together, it seems likely that one or two of these risks might occur in the next year, with a sharp impact on the stock. Risk 4: Poor corporate governance oversight. You would think that Sands would be holding on to every dollar of cash possible, seeing as how the stock dropped from $140 to $1 and was being questioned as a going concern less than a year ago. But, you'd be wrong. Corporate governance has and likely always will be very poor at this company. On October 29, Sands declared a quarterly dividend of $2.50 per share to the holders of 10% Series A Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock. It's not clear how much of this stock Chairman and Chief Executive Sheldon Adelson himself owns, but we know (from the Sands 2009 proxy statement) that his wife, Dr. Miriam Adelson, bought 5.25 million of these shares from the company on November 14, 2008. That means Adelson's wife will collect $13 million on just this one quarterly dividend payment, or $50 million annually -- roughly 10% of their recent $500 million in total cost savings Sands management boasted about.
My personal favorite egregious expense at Las Vegas Sands involves SVP Rob Goldstein. Goldstein is in charge of Sands' Vegas properties and was front and center on the recent earnings calls. He was paid $3.8 million in total compensation in 2006, $3.2 million in 2007 and $2.6 million in 2008. In the spring of this year, in its proxy statement, Sands disclosed that: "During 2008, a subsidiary of the Company performed work at a home owned by Mr. Goldstein, the Company's Senior Vice President. The Company's cost and overhead for the job was $364,000. Mr. Goldstein believes and the Company agrees that some of the work was not performed in an appropriate manner. The Company and Mr. Goldstein are working together to determine the amount that may be due." Later, in its second-quarter10-Q release in August, Sands buried in the back under "Other Matters" the following: "As previously disclosed, during 2008, a subsidiary of the Company performed work at a home owned by Robert G. Goldstein, the Company's Executive Vice President. Mr. Goldstein believed, and the Company acknowledged, that some of the work was not performed in an appropriate manner. The matter was referred to an independent expert, who concurred about the quality of the work and concluded that Mr. Goldstein should not be obligated to pay the $0.4 million incurred by the Company for costs and overhead on the job. These findings have been accepted by the Company and Mr. Goldstein." So, to review, a Sands subsidiary got to do $360,000 worth of remodeling construction work on Goldstein's house - paid for out of the Sands' shareholders' coffers and Goldstein gets to enjoy the benefits of the work for free. Who is this "independent expert" and how can I arrange for him to come and adjudicate some faulty remodeling work paid for by Sands at my house?
Clearly, it's "buyer beware" for shareholders at Las Vegas Sands, and Sands makes no bones about it. One of its "risk factors" listed in their 10-K is that "[t] he interests of Mr. Adelson may conflict with your interests." The bottom line is that Las Vegas Sands' management is betting that the Macau market will stay hot and that Vegas will come back from historic lows this year. My belief is that one or more of the risks cited above will surprise to the downside within the next year - and that's why I think it's more likely the stock will go lower than this, rather than higher, over the next 12 months. At the time of publication, Jackson's fund held a net short position in LVS and a long position in WYNN.
Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.



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